LONGER THAN THE OLD TESTAMENT,
MORE CONFUSING THAN THE TAX CODE:1
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1992 CABLE ACT
Rafael G. Prohias

"[O]ne of the greatest savings in the face of monopoly pricing in the history of American business"
may finally be in sight.2 Or is it? Following years of
consumer complaints, Congress enacted the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act").' The 1992 Cable
Act set basic standards for cable regulation, and authorized the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") to implement detailed
regulations that would effectuate the 1992 Cable
Act's objectives." This resulted in a mammoth rate
regulation Report and Order released by the FCC
on May 3, 1993.' The Rate Order, however, has not
been as effective as originally planned. In fact, on
February 22, 1994, the FCC adopted a Second Order on Reconsideration6 modifying its previous cable
television rate regulation scheme. In the Second Rate
Order, the Commission required cable systems to reduce rates by seventeen percent from the September
1992 levels. 7 FCC Chairman Reed Hundt claimed
that cable consumers could now expect up to $3 billion dollars in cable bill savings.'
The FCC and Congress hope that the additional

cable rate reduction will quell, at least for the moment, the debate that has raged over the last twelve
months. When the 1992 Cable Act became law on
October 5, 1992, it was heralded as a breakthrough;
a solution to consumer complaints of skyrocketing
rates and abysmal service.9 It appears, however, that
the 1992 Cable Act's promise may have been premature. Criticism of the 1992 Cable Act has intensified
recently, with the brunt of such criticism directed at
the most important goal of the Act-lowering the
prices consumers pay for cable service. 10
The 1992 Cable Act directed the FCC to ensure
that basic cable television rates remain "reasonable."" The effect of the Act, in many instances,
however, has been to raise basic rates, not lower
them.
This Comment analyzes the reasons behind the
failed objectives of the 1992 Cable Act and briefly
traces events that occurred preceding, and subsequent to, the promulgation of the 1992 Cable Act.
Part I tracks the history of cable rate regulation and
Congress's subsequent decision to deregulate the
cable television industry in 1984. Part II outlines

' FCC Plans Tutorial; Cable Officials Say It Will Take
Weeks To Assess Impact of Rate Benchmarks, COMM. DAILY,
May 5, 1993, at 2 (statement by Community Antenna Television Association President Stephen Effros).
' David Lieberman, FCC Orders Cable Rates Cut Up To
7%, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1994, at Al (quoting FCC Chairman Reed Hundt).
I Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1465
(1992)(to be codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-555).
" In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Rate Regulation, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd. 5631 (1993)[hereinafter Rate Order];
see also Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 8 FCC Rcd. 510
(1992).
IId.
6
In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Second Or-

der on Reconsideration, Fourth Report and Order, and Fifth
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Dkt. No. 92-266,
FCC 94-38, para. 1 (Feb. 22, 1994) [hereinafter Second Rate
Order].
7
Id. para. 19. This marked the second time in less than a
year that the Commission reduced cable rates. The FCC had
first established a 10% reduction in September 1992. Rate Order, supra note 4, para. 15.
Lieberman, supra note 2, at Al.
o Although President Bush originally vetoed S. 12, the U.S.
Senate voted 74-25 to override the veto. See 138 Cong. Rec.
S16,676 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992). The U.S. House of Representatives followed suit the same day. See 138 Cong. Rec. H11,48788 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
10 S.Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1992), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1133 [hereinafter Senate Report]("[t]he purpose of this legislation is to ... provide protection for consumers against monopoly rates").
'I Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 623(b)(1).
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how and why the federal government undertook to
reregulate cable rates, including the scheme the
Commission proposed to utilize. Part III analyzes
what went wrong, and how the goals of the 1992
Cable Act may have been frustrated through poor
draftsmanship and lack of foresight. Part IV finds
that had Congress and the Commission been privy to
the realities of the cable industry, the 1992 Cable
Act's rate regulation provisions could have been
more properly tailored to meet the Act's goals.
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tween the two bodies was bound to result in conflict.

In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,9 the Supreme
Court clarified the boundaries of this dual jurisdictional authority, holding that the FCC's regulatory
authority superseded the states' own broad regulatory powers. 0 This is not to say that the states no
longer enjoyed any regulatory powers with regard to
cable television. However, those powers it did possess were dictated by the Commission:
Thus, we have consistently taken the position that to the
degree we deem necessary, we will preempt areas of cable
regulation in order to assure the orderly development of
this new technology into the national communications

I. CABLE REGULATION PRIOR TO THE
1992 CABLE ACT

structure. At the same time, we have attempted . . . to

The FCC began regulating the cable industry in
the mid-1960s,12 justifying its regulatory stance with
the argument that cable television threatened the viability of the broadcast medium." As a result, the
FCC began to assert increasing regulatory power
over cable television. 1 4 The Supreme Court affirmed
this broad power, but limited it to that which was
"reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting.""5 The result was
a program of "deliberately structured dualism,"
whereby federal and state regulators split jurisdictional responsibility for the regulation of the cable
industry."' Local authorities granted franchises to
cable operators, outlined franchise areas, oversaw the
construction of cable facilities and preserved rightsof-way,1" while federal regulators maintained exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects of cable
television, including technical standards, signal carriage and pay cable. 8
This broad delineation of regulatory powers be" See In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, To Adopt
Rules and Regulations To Govern the Grant of Authorizations
in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay
Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966), afl'd sub nom. Black
Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
1" Id. at 782. Specifically, the Commission felt that many ultra high frequency ("UHF") television stations were failing due
to the cable industry. Id.
1"
See In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143
(1972)(codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57, 76.59, 76.61), afl'd sub
nor. ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter 1972 Cable Television Report and Order]. The 1972 Cable
Television Report and Order established a number of significant
regulations for cable systems, including the requirements to
carry local television stations ("must-carry" rules) and the limitation on the number of distant television stations a cable system
could carry ("market quota" rules).

leave a significant amount of regulatory responsibility at
the non-federal level."1

A.

The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984

The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
("1984 Cable Act") embodied, for the first time, a
congressional attempt to formulate a national regulatory policy for cable television.2 2 Simply put, the
1984 Cable Act was the cable industry's bill,
designed to "[m]inimize unnecessary regulation that
would impose an undue economic burden on cable
systems."2 " The 1984 Cable Act's legislative history
indicates that the impetus of the Act was to establish
"a uniform national policy for broadband telecommunications [that could] serve to eliminate and prevent conflicting counterproductive regulations so that
cable [could] be a competitive medium. 21 4 With the
1984 Cable Act, Congress endeavored to create a
scheme whereby local franchise authorities shared
16
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,
178 (1968).
16
1972 Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 14,

para. 177.
1I

Id. paras. 177-188.

In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations Relative to an Inquiry on the Need for Additional Rules in the Area of Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation of Cable Television, Report and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d
855, para. 25 (1975) [hereinafter Over-Regulation Report and
Order].
1, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
20
Id. at 704.
31
Over-Regulation Report and Order, supra note 18, para.
24.
"a Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)(codified at 47
U.S.C. § 521-559 (1992)).
23 47 U.S.C. § 521(6) (1988).
"' See S. Rep. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983).
16
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authority with the FCC.2 5 Before the 1984 Cable
Act was enacted, local franchising authorities could
regulate rates for basic cable service.2 6 The 1984
Cable Act stripped local franchising authorities of
this power and permitted them to regulate cable
rates only to the extent "effective competition" did
not exist.2 7 "Effective competition" was defined as
the presence of "at least three unduplicated television
signals" in the cable community. 8 These three signals could be any broadcast signal that placed a
"Grade B Contour" 29 over any portion of the cable
community; was deemed "significantly viewed"
within a cable community; 0 or was transmitted from
a translator station located within the cable community. 1 The effective competition standard ensured
that ninety-six percent of all cable communities
would not be subject to rate regulation. 2
As noted above, the purpose and effect of the 1984
Cable Act was not regulation, but deregulation.
Congress envisioned deregulation as the stimulus
needed to spark a boom in cable television "benefiting both consumers and industry participants
alike."" Additionally, Congress hoped that competing programming sources would emerge, thereby
keeping rates low.34
B.

The Effects of Deregulation

By the early 1990s, the majority of Congress's
stated objectives under the 1984 Cable Act became a
reality. One objective was to develop cable television
into a pervasive presence in American households.
According to H.R. 102-628 to the 1992 Cable Act,
cable penetration stood at sixty-one percent of AmerSee H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 24
(1984)(characterizing local franchise authorities as the "primary
means of cable television regulation"); 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988)
(giving the Commission jurisdiction over cable under the Communications Act of 1934).
S
In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations Relative to the Advisability of Federal Preemption of Cable Television Technical Standards or the Imposition
of a Moratorium on Non-Federal Standards, Notice, 46
F.C.C.2d 175, para. 84 (1974). "Basic cable service" is defined
as service regularly provided to all cable subscribers, as opposed
to "pay cable service," that includes Home Box Office, Cinemax,
Showtime and others. Id.
:7
47 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
8 47 C.F.R. § 76.33(a)(2) (1985).
2

29
Id. Grade B Contours indicate the approximate extent of
coverage over average terrain in the absence of interference from
other television stations. These contours vary from station to station. 47 C.F.R. § 73.683(a) (1992).
SO

Id. The 1972 Cable Television Report and Order, supra

ican homes in 1992, up from thirty-seven percent in
1985. 85
The checks and balances Congress envisioned to
keep cable television rates from skyrocketing, however, did not occur. In fact, the cable television industry was not providing the low rates and quality
of service Congress anticipated with the passage of
the 1984 Cable Act."6 Furthermore, competition
from other video programming technologies, such as
satellite service and wireless cable, never materialized, leaving cable television with monopoly market
power."a Without effective competition from other
technologies, nothing prevented cable operators from
charging exorbitant rates.
As a result, Representative Edward J. Markey
(D-Ma.), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance, ordered the Government Accounting Office ("GAO") to conduct a
survey of existing cable systems to determine the status of the deregulated cable television industry. 6
The GAO surveyed 2,000 of the 11,000 existing
cable systems and received approximately 1,500 responses.3 9 The survey concluded that since deregulation under the 1984 Cable Act, monthly rates for the
lowest-priced basic cable service had risen twentynine percent and rates for the most popular basic
cable service had risen twenty-six percent. 4 These
increases constituted three times the Consumer Price
Index.4 1 The most disturbing aspect of the study was
that the high cable rates were attributable not to the
increasing cost of service, but to the cable television
industry's market power.42
In response to the GAO study, the Commission
re-defined the term "effective competition" to subject
note 14, undertook to determine the initial list of "significantly
viewed" stations, found in so-called "Appendix B" of Part 76 of
the Rules, and § 76.54 specifies the mechanism for new stations
to be deemed significantly viewed.
01
47 C.F.R. § 76.33(a) (1985).
H.R. Rep. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1992)
[hereinafter House Report].
33
Id. at 29.
"
Id. at 30.
85 Id. at 29.
S6

Id. at 29-30.

Id. at 30. In fact, these competing technologies have only
a five percent penetration in American households. Id.
" Id. at 31.
39 Senate Report, supra note 10, at 5.
40
Id. It should be noted that these figures only constitute an
average number. The worst offenders increased basic cable rates
anywhere from 94% to 204%. Id. at 5-6.
,1 H.R. Rep. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1992).
37

42

Id.
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more cable systems to rate regulation."3 This effort,
however, provided relief to only twenty percent of
cable subscribers." As a result, it became clear that
Congress would again intervene.

tional outlets and leasing and repairing equipment.""2 The equipment basket may not include a
cable operator's direct costs of equipment sold to
customers.53

II. REGULATION REVISITED - THE 1992
CABLE ACT

A.

The 1984 Cable Act was implemented to serve the
needs of the cable industry. Under the 1992 Cable
Act, local franchising authorities and the FCC
jointly regulate the rates of cable companies. 45 Rates
for the basic cable service tier are subject to rate regulation by the local franchising authorities, as long
as the Commission "certifies" that the rules adopted
by local franchising authorities are consistent with
FCC regulations. 4" Rates for cable programming
services other than the programming carried by the
basic tier are to be regulated by the Commission
only if a complaint is made, and then only if the
47
Commission finds such rates to be "unreasonable.
Programming offered on a per program or per channel basis is not subject to rate regulation."
The 1992 Cable Act also requires that rates for
equipment and installations be separated from other
basic tier rates," the so-called "unbundling" of
equipment. Thus, cable subscribers will pay separate
charges "for each significantly different type of remote, converter box and installation. ' 50 Equipment
and installation charges must be "unbundled" in order to apply the separate equipment and programming service standards required by the Act.5 1 Under
the FCC's "actual cost" standard, a cable operator
must create an equipment basket "to which it will
assign the direct costs of service installation, addiIn re Re-examination of the Effective Competition Standard for the Regulation of Cable Television Basic Service Rates,
Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 6 FCC Rcd. 4545, para. 1 (1991).
44 Id.
48 Rate Order, supra note 4, para. 2.
" Id. para. 3. If the Commission determines that the local
franchising authority has not met the requirements of section
623 (a)(3), the local franchise authority may revise or modify its
certification. If the FCC still refuses to certify the local franchising authority, section 623(a)(6) grants the Commission jurisdiction over rate regulation of the basic service tier. See In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Rate Regulation, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 8 FCC Rcd. 510, paras. 23-24
(1992) [hereinafter Rate Regulation NPRM].
' Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 623(c).
48 Rate Order, supra note 4, para. 4.
'
Id. para. 284. However, small cable systems, those serving
less than 1,000 subscribers, are exempt from this requirement
48

Effective Competition

First and foremost, the 1992 Cable Act strives to
curb the substantial market power the cable industry
can assert over subscribers, programmers and potential competitors."4 The 1992 Cable Act creates a rebuttable presumption that all cable systems are not
subject to "effective competition" and states that
cable systems not subject to "effective competition"
are subject to rate regulation.5 5 Section 623 of the
Act provides that "effective competition" exists
when:
(a) fewer than 30 percent of the households in the
franchise area subscribe to a cable system; (b) the
franchise area is served by at least two unaffiliated multichannel video programming distributors each of which
offers comparable video programming to at least 50 percent of the households in the franchise area and the number of households subscribing to programming services offered by multichannel video programming distributors
exceeds 15 percent of the households in the franchise area;
or (3) the franchising authority in the subject franchise
area is itself a multichannel video programming distributor and offers video programming to at least 50 percent of
the households in that franchise area."

Unlike the 1984 Cable Act, where the "effective
competition" standard subjected only three percent of
cable areas to rate regulation, the 1992 Cable Act
attempted to ensure that virtually every cable system
would be subject to rate regulation.
and instead may make rate reductions by reducing each regulated billed item by 14% (which equals the 17% competitive differential reduced by approximately 3% inflation that occurred
between October 1992 and September 1993). Second Rate Order, supra note 6, para. 41.
0 Rate Order, supra note 4, para. 288.
81 Id. para. 287.
5,

Id. para. 295.

Id. para. 295 n.713. Nevertheless, the equipment basket
may include a slight profit margin not to exceed 11.25%. Id.
para. 295 n.715.
5'
Senate Report, supra note 10, at 9-11.
55 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2) (1988). Both the 1984 and 1992
Cable Acts conclude that cable systems under "effective competition" are not subject to rate regulation. The difference, however,
is in the definition of "effective competition." Compare Pub. L.
No. 102-385, § 623(a)(2) with 47 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
8" Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 623(1)(1)(B), (C) (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2)).
58
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The Benchmarks

In requiring that rates could not be "unreasonable," Congress merely stated that the FCC's regulations had to be designed to achieve statutory goals
and to take into account statutory factors.6 7 Congress
left the determination of what a reasonable rate
should be to the FCC and state and local governments." Pursuant to congressional intent, the Commission began the arduous task of defining what in
fact was a "reasonable rate" with the issuance of a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making." The result was
the voluminous Rate Order. °
The Rate Order established a regulatory system
based on "benchmark" formulas."1 The benchmark
system presumes that current cable rates for the basic service tier not under effective competition reflect
pervasive market power.6 Therefore, by calculating
the average difference between rates subject to effective competition and those that are not, the Commission took the next logical step in determining "reasonable" rates. Upon conducting a survey of rates as
of September 30, 1992, the Commission found that
rates not subject to effective competition were, on the
average, ten percent higher than rates subject to effective competition.6 As a result, the FCC permitted
local franchising authorities to "rollback" basic cable
rates ten percent if the system was not subject to effective competition and its rates exceeded the
benchmarks by ten percent.6 4 Rates charged by cable
systems for the basic service tier are compared to a
table of benchmarks established by the FCC based
on the average September 30, 1992 rates of systems
subject to effective competition.6 ' This table of
benchmarks takes into account three significant factors: the number of subscribers, the number of regu" Rate Order, supra note 4, App. A at 12.
" Id. para. 2.
59 Rate Regulation NPRM, supra note 46.
00
Rate Order, supra note 4.
01
Id. paras. 185-188.
IId. App. A at 3.
63
Id.
Id. The Commission will also be permitted to rollback
rates for cable programming services on the basis of individual
complaints if those rates are not subject to effective competition.
Id. However, if a cable operator already charges rates at or below the benchmark, no rollback will be instituted.
65 Id. App. A at 14.
"

Id. para. 214.

17

In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television

Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Rate Regulation, First Order on Reconsideration, Second Report and Order, and Third Notice Of Proposed Rule Making, 58 Fed. Reg.
46,718 (1993) [hereinafter Rate Reconsideration Order]. Rate

lated channels, and the number of regulated satellitedelivered signals.66 The initial regulated rate for
such a system will be its rate in effect on the date the
67
system becomes subject to regulation.
The Price Cap

C.

In order to be effective, the Commission recognized that rate regulation must not ignore economic
realities, such as inflation and other factors that impair a cable operator's ability to recover costs. Thus,
the FCC instituted a price cap mechanism to regulate future increases in cable rates once the initial
rate proceeding was completed. This price cap system ensures that future rate increases remain within
6
reasonable limits. 8
Once regulated rates are determined, the price cap
mechanism incorporates an annual adjustment index
that permits changes in each system's cap for the basic tier.69 The Commission adopted the GNP fixed
weight price index ("GNP-PI") as the annual adjustment index. 70 In effect, cable operators may adjust the capped base per channel rate for the basic
service tier each year after the final GNP-PI is published for the preceding year.71 Capped rates may be
adjusted annually for inflation.72
Additionally, cable operators may pass along to
subscribers certain categories of "external costs" if
such costs exceed inflation. These categories include
the costs of retransmission consent fees incurred after
October 6, 1994, other programming cost increases,
taxes, and the costs of franchise fees and franchise
requirements including public, educational and government ("PEG") access channels. 3
regulations were to take effect on June 21, 1993. The FCC
however deferred the effective date until October 1, 1993 based
on "resource constraints." In re Implementation of Sections of

the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,560, para. 2, 73 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P&F) 14 (1993) [hereinafter Rate Regulation Deferral]. Significantly, political pressure led the Commission to revise the effective date of rules establishing rate regulation once again to an
earlier date, from October 1, 1993 to September 1, 1993. In re
Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Order, 58 Fed. Reg.
41,042 (1993). Individual cable systems are not subject to rate
regulation until notified by local authorities.
68 Rate Order, supra note 4, App. A at 15.
69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

11 Rate Reconsideration Order, supra note 67, para. 87.
73

Rate Order, supra note 4, paras. 246-254.
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D.

The Cable Rate Freeze

In April 1993, the Commission feared that cable
operators would raise basic tier rates before the 1992
Cable Act came into effect in an attempt to recover
anticipated lost profits resulting from the new regulations. Consequently, on the same day the FCC established rules implementing rate regulation,"4 it
also adopted a "rate freeze" applicable to all cable
systems not subject to effective competition. 5 In addition to preventing rate increases, the Commission
concluded that the "rate freeze" would give local
franchising authorities time to establish their certification for regulation of basic service tier rates and
give consumers time to become familiar with the new
local and federal rules. 6
Essentially, the rate freeze prohibited the average
monthly subscriber bill for services subject to rate
regulation from rising above the average monthly bill
as determined on April 15, 1993." According to the
Commission, the average monthly bill must be calculated by "determining for a monthly billing cycle the
sum of all billed monthly charges for all cable services subject to regulation under Section 623 of the
Communications Act and dividing that sum by the
number of subscribers receiving any of those services." 8 This freeze, however, does not prevent cable
operators from adding subscribers, retiering, or adding additional program services as long as the total
average bill does not increase.7 9 The rate increase
freeze was to be in effect for only 120 days, until
August 15, 1993.80
Predictably, cable operators and its advocates
charged that the 1992 Cable Act and its rate regulation provisions would strike a fatal blow to the
emerging cable industry. Following the Commission's Rate Order and Rate Freeze Order, the National Cable Television Association ("NCTA") and
74
71

Id.

In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Order, 8
FCC Red 2921, para. 3 (1993)[hereinafter Rate Freeze Order].
This rate freeze has been extended numerous times, culminating
in an expiration date of May 15, 1994. See Implementation of
Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 8 FCC Red. 2921 (1993), clarified, 8 FCC
Red. 2917, (1993), extended, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,560, 73 Rad. Reg.
2d (P&F) 14 (1993), extended, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,141, 74 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P&F) 13 (1993), extended, 59 Fed. Reg. 6901, 74 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P&F) 732 (1994).
76 Rate Freeze Order, supra note 75, para. 3 (1993).
77 Id. para. 4. The FCC did provide some relief to cable
operators by agreeing to entertain petitions for emergency relief
from those systems that could show the rate freeze "would impose severe economic hardship or threaten the viability of contin-
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its then-President James Mooney denounced the
FCC's actions:
At a minimum, it appears that these rules will make it
very difficult for us to satisfy the expectations of our subscribers for quality programming and services. These
things [quality programming and services] are expensive
to provide, and rate rollbacks, while always temporarily
popular, almost always are destructive to quality."'81

Mooney also alleged that the Commission had
"misconstrued" the 1992 Cable Act by "ordering
across-the-board rollbacks of rates for upper-tier or
cable programming services," which, in effect, "disregarded Congress's instruction that such rates be
regulated only in response to complaints .... ,82
Mooney hinted that the FCC's actions could form
the basis for a court appeal. 8"
Additionally, cable operators argued that the
Commission's rate regulations were overly burdensome, difficult to construe, and made compliance virtually impossible. In fact, FCC officials agreed that
although the benchmarks themselves were clear, very
few cable systems had the equipment cost information needed to determine how much rates were to be
lowered or even whether their rates were actually
below the benchmark at all." Small cable operators
were particularly frustrated. Community Antenna
Television Association ("CATA") President Stephen
Effros claimed that the rules "were clearly written
by Common Carrier Bureau people who apparently
were not aware that they call for figures that the
cable industry doesn't have

. .

. [tihe FCC has writ-

ten something that is longer than the Old Testament
and more confusing than the tax code, all in one
document." 85
In May 1993, NCTA filed a petition with the
Commission for a limited stay of the June 21, 1993
effective date of the 1992 Cable Act rate regulaued cable service." Id. para. 3 n.6. Nevertheless, such a burden
of proof is so high that all cable systems would effectively be
subject to the rate freeze. FCC Freezes Cable Rates, Sets Stage
For $1 Billion Rollback, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 2, 1993, at 1
(quoting Alexandra Wilson of the Mass Media Bureau).
78
Rate Freeze Order, supra note 75, para. 3 n.7.

11

80

Id. para. 4.

Id. para. 4.

0' NCTA Denounces Cable Rate Rules, FCC REP., Apr. 7,
1993, at 11.
", Joe Flint, Rate Rules "Pretty Much As Advertised,"
BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 10, 1993, at 5, 14.
s

Id.

"

FCC Plans Tutorial; Cable Officials Say It Will Take

Weeks To Assess Impact of Rate Benchmarks, COMM. DAILY,

May 5, 1993, at 2.
85 Id.at 3.
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tions.8 6 NCTA argued that it required more time to
"make reasonable changes in service offerings,"
given the time it would take to digest the voluminous
586-page Rate Order, gather the requisite information, and apply the necessary formulas."'
The fact that the Commission denied NCTA's petition was neither surprising nor in the end significant. What was telling, however, was a concurring
statement issued by FCC Commissioner Andrew C.
Barrett, in which he expressed concern over the rush
to implement the 1992 Cable Act and its provisions:
I do not believe that the [Rate] Order sufficiently explains

delayed pending supplementary funding. 9 .. Additionally, the Commissioners hinted that enforcement
of other regulatory matters would be delayed without appropriate funding. The Commission concluded that the additional period of time would "ensure a smooth transition to rate regulation" by
allowing cable operators and franchising authorities
more time to implement and comply with the new
rate regulations.9 5
Although the cable industry breathed a sigh of relief, congressional leaders were not sympathetic to
the FCC's concerns. Representative Markey reacted
angrily:

the basis for a June 21 effective date deadline, in light of
the market-based actions required to comply with our...
rate regulation order, and the rate implications of other
1992 Cable Act requirements . . . I also remain aware
that companies need reasonable periods of time to assess
the full impact of these complex regulations, bring their
operations into compliance, and realign their employee
efforts.88

This statement would be a sign of things to come.
Although cable operators had petitioned the Commission for an extension of the deadline, it was the
Commission itself that in the end bowed to the 1992
Cable Act's overwhelming requirements. 8 9 On June
11, 1993, the FCC deferred implementation of the
rate regulation provisions until October 1, 1993, and
extended the rate freeze until November 15, 1993.90
The Commission's reason for the deferral was the
same reason cable operators had been advancing
since the beginning of the debate over the 1992
Cable Act; that rate regulation provisions were complicated and costly.9 1
Citing that it was already operating under a
budget shortfall of $18 million for fiscal year 1993,
the FCC concluded that additional appropriations
from Congress were necessary in order to achieve the
1992 Cable Act's objectives. 92 All three FCC Commissioners wrote members of Congress indicating
that the only alternative was to implement the rules
as scheduled; however, this would entail notifying
franchise authorities and consumers that FCC mail
responses, certifications, etc., would be "substantially
"6 In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Rate Regulation, Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 3652, para. 2 (1993).
87

Id.

I (concurring statement of Commissioner Andrew C.
Id.
Barrett).

8 Rate Regulation Deferral, supra note 67.
90 Id. para. 1.
" Id. paras. 2-3.
9' Id. para. 2.

[T]he lack of resources for implementing some provisions
of rate regulation is not a sufficient excuse to delay action
on implementing all rate regulation . . . After waiting

four years and enduring monopoly pricing and rate gouging, consumers were told by the FCC on April 1 that relief was in sight. Now those rate reductions are being
snatched from the hands of consumers."

The Commission eventually convinced Congress to
appropriate more money, and the effective date for
rate regulation was moved up to September 1,
1993. a
Nevertheless, the debate over the 1992 Cable Act's
rate regulation provisions intensified and heated discussions over the Act shifted from a fray between the
FCC and cable operators to a confrontation between
the FCC and Congress. The two factions that had
begun on the same side-the FCC and Congress-were now ready to do battle, all ostensibly for
the benefit of the cable consumer. By September, the
debate reached new heights as word reached Capitol
Hill that despite the implementation of the rate regulations, cable television rates were actually going
8
up.9
Congress versus the FCC

E.

Weeks before the September 1, 1993 effective date
of the Commission's rate regulations, various reports
in the news media surfaced alleging that many con93
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Rate Regulation Deferral, supra note 67, para. 3.
FCC Says It Will Delay, supra note 93.
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In re Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Order, 58
Fed. Reg. 41,042 (1993).
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sumers' cable rates would rise." Although FCC Acting Chairman James Quello characterized the reports as an "industry spin,"1 00 cable operators
argued that many customers would indeed face increases. 1 ' For example, basic cable rates in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area reportedly increased by almost 10%.101 The increases for basic
service ranged from 34.8% in Prince George's
County, Maryland to 19.1% in Howard County,
Maryland. 0 8 Increases for the more popular tiers of
service reportedly were as high as 15.8% in Fairfax,
Virginia."" In the aggregate, one-third of the cable
systems surveyed had increased rates. 0 5 Cable operators in Baltimore, Maryland anticipated raising
rates for 40% of their subscribers.' Cable systems
on the west coast were also preparing to make cable
subscribers pay more. Reports speculated that as
many as 100,000 of San Diego County's 650,000plus cable customers were likely to see rate hikes.'0 7
Not surprisingly, consumers were not reticent in
voicing their outrage. Complaints poured into the
FCC and Capitol Hill, prompting Representative
Markey to act. Initially, the blame was placed on
cable operators. In early September 1993, Markey
charged "[tihe [cable] industry [with] attempting to
evade the intent of the [1992 Cable Act] by continuing to raise rates."' 0 8
By late September 1993, however, Markey turned
his focus away from the cable industry and to the
FCC, demanding that the FCC explain why the
1992 Cable Act went awry. Markey solicited members of Congress to sign a letter urging the FCC to
reassess its new rate regulations.' 0 Markey asserted
" Id.; Christopher Stern, MSO's Say Rate Reg May Raise
Some Cable Bills,

BROADCASTING & CABLE,

Aug. 9, 1993, at

16.
100

Kim McAvoy, Quello Blasts Rate Hike Stories, BROAD-

CASTING & CABLE,

Aug. 23, 1993, at 53.
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Stern, supra note 99, at 16.
Singletary, supra note 98, at Al.

100

Id.

104

Id.
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Id.

104

LaWanda Edwards, Baltimore's Cable Television Sta-

tions Switch To Fed Mandated Cable Rates, WARFIELD'S Bus.
REC., Sept. 3, 1993, at 13.
107 James W. Crawley, Many Cable Customers To See
Hikes, Not Cuts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 1, 1993, at
Al.
10"
Brooks Boliek, Markey Irked By Cable Hikes;
Lawmaker Prepping Probe, Says Raising Rates 'At Odds With
Spirit Of Law, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 2, 1993, at 4.
109 Brooks
Boliek, Markey: Reopen Cable Case,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 22, 1993, at 4.
110
Id.
. Cindy Skrzycki, Lawmakers Lean on FCC Over New
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that because "[Congress has] begun to see how some
operators are increasing rates instead of lowering
them, and essentially avoiding the rate reductions
called for in the regulations ... the FCC should adjust the rate regulations to protect consumers."" 0 All
told, 130 members of Congress wrote Acting FCC
Chairman James Quello to express their deep concern over rate increases. "[I]t appears that a number
of cable companies are planning to raise, rather than
lower, their cable rates. Such a perverse result forces
us to question whether these rate increases reflect a
flaw or loophole in the Commission's regulations.""'
On September 28, 1993, the House Telecommunications Subcommittee conducted an oversight hearing
to ascertain the effectiveness of the 1992 Cable
Act." 2 Although not a trial per se, the tone of the
hearing was adversarial, as all three FCC Commissioners took the stand to defend the Commission's
regulations." 8 On one side were the embarrassed
and angry legislators, represented by Markey, who
had continually promised constituents lower rates.
Republicans on the subcommittee were eager to
characterize the 1992 Cable Act as "one of the worst
public policies devised, crafted, and enacted by Congress," that is "failing painfully, miserably and publicly.""' Democrats on the subcommittee also expressed their concerns. Markey insisted that cable
rate regulation was not supposed to result in higher
rates for the first year,"' and yet cable operators
were claiming that subscribers will pay more. According to Markey, the FCC was partly to blame.""
On the other side of the debate, the FCC Commissioners argued that the Commission's rules did
Cable Rules,

WASH.

POST, Sept. 25, 1993, at Cl; see also

COMM. DAILY, Sept. 27, 1993, at 8 (statements by U.S. Reps.

Oxley (R-Ohio) and Fields (R-Tex.) stating letter "is nothing
more than an attempt to shift the blame for the 1992 Cable Act
debacle" to the FCC).
"
Oversight Hearing on the Implementation of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
and Provisions Implementing Rate Regulation Before the House
Subcomm. on Telecom. and Finance, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1993) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
"'
One publication described it as "opponents clash[ing]
[a] sparring match" over the 1992 Cable Act. Dennis
Wharton, Rereg Rehashed in Capitol Fray, DAILY VARIETY,
Sept. 29, 1993, at 14.
114
Id. U.S. Rep. Michael Oxley (R-Ohio) stated "President
Bush is starting to look pretty good right now," referring to the
former President's original veto of the 1992 Cable Act, which
eventually succumbed to the only Congressional override of the
Bush administration. Id.
"" Henry Gilgoff, Benefit of New Cable Law Unclear,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1993, at 7.
118 Id.
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not go astray on the issue of rate regulation. Acting
Chairman James Quello stated that it would be premature to pass judgment on the 1992 Cable Act or
the rate regulations passed by the Commission until
specific data had been compiled. It would be unwise,
said Quello, to "speculate, or perhaps worse, act
precipitously based on anecdotal and possibly flawed
information" from the news media. ' As a result,
the Commission authorized a cable rate survey of the
rates charged to subscribers before the September 1,
1993 effective date of the new rate rules." ' According to Quello, the survey would solicit data from the
ten largest cable systems, which are controlled by the
twenty-five largest multiple system operators*serving
approximately seventy-five percent of all cable subscribers nationally. The data was to be submitted to

increased.""

the FCC by October 1, 1993."9 "There's been some

A.

creative pricing going on," Quello conceded, and
"we've got to find out what rates have gone up and
what rates have gone down and why."'"2
When the preliminary results of the rate survey
arrived in mid-October, 1993, some, but not all, of
the confusion dissipated. The Commission declared
that since the rate regulations had gone into effect "a
substantial number of subscribers" saw rate decreases. 121 Specifically, the figures showed that
while 31% of cable consumers suffered higher rates,
68% of cable consumers actually saw a decrease in
their rates.' 22 These figures, however, represented
only fourteen of the twenty-five companies surveyed.
The FCC withheld the remaining data because "the
other eleven companies have so radically altered
their programming and price structures that the
agency could not draw firm conclusions about which
way their prices have gone. '"2"

Critics contended

that the Commission's survey was wholly inadequate
because the reported results from fourteen of the
twenty-five cable companies only accounted for eight
million out of fifty-seven million subscribers. Some
critics charged that the FCC had selectively used information to support its argument that rates had not
Oversight Hearing, supra note 112, at 5 (statement of
James Quello, Acting Chairman, FCC).
117
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HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 20, 1993, at 4.

121
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News, Oct. 21, 1993, at 1.
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WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1993, at B1.
123
124

Id.
Id.

Congress also agreed that the survey was deficient.
Republican legislators claimed that because thirtyone percent of cable bills increased, it was a clear
indication that current FCC procedures were "not
what Congress had in mind" when it passed the
1992 Cable Act. 2 5 Even Markey, who had recently
expressed support for the Commission and its policies, was dissatisfied. Following the release of the
"preliminary findings," Markey responded by ordering another survey to be conducted by GAO.' In
response, the FCC stated that it would have a more
complete survey by November 4, 1993."27

III.

WHAT WENT WRONG
Poor Draftsmanship or Creative Pricing?

Given the confusing, and often times contradictory, information released by the Commission and
the media, it is difficult to assess whether the FCC's
rate regulations have been effective or not. One conclusion, however, is inescapable-some cable rates
have increased. The mere fact that rates have gone
up is puzzling to both advocates and opponents of
the 1992 Cable Act. As Markey stated at the September 28, 1993 oversight hearing, "[wihile opponents to the Cable Act predicted that [rate regulations] would increase .cable rates during the debate
on the bill, never was it suggested that rates would
increase as a result of rate regulation."'28 So how, in
fact, did rates go up?
It is evident that the recent debate, including the
oversight hearing, produced no answers." 9 Although
cable operators have been accused of violating the
rules via creative pricing, the real culprits are Congress and the FCC, who crafted regulations without
any real-world knowledge of how cable companies
operate, and without endeavoring to reflect on poten-

tial loopholes they had created by overlaying telephone-type regulatory concepts on an industry that
129

Punitive Actions Possible, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 22, 1993,

at 2 (statement by U.S. Rep. Boucher (D-Va.).
126 Paul Farhi, FCC Hedges on Saying Cable Rates Fell,
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1993, at B1.
'" Id. at B6. The Commission released its final report on
the cable rate survey on February 22, 1994. Action in Docket
Case-FCCReleases Final Report on Cable Rate Survey (MM
Dkt. No. 92-266), FCC News, Feb. 22, 1994.
128
See Oversight Hearing, supra note 112, at 3 (emphasis in

original).
129 In fact, some commentators argued "there was little attempt to pin down [this] central question . . . ... WARREN'S
CABLE REG. MONITOR, Oct. 4, 1993, at 6.
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had never been regulated in that manner.
The FCC's cable regulations established a benchmark level that was to result in a rollback of rates by
at least ten percent. This rollback was expected to
save cable consumers approximately $1 billion. The
regulations, however, also permitted operators to
raise certain prices and change programming tiers as
long as the total revenue from the increases was not
greater than the cuts required by the regulations.1"'
This means that cable operators whose rates were
below the benchmark levels could raise their rates to
benchmark levels if the increases were offset by cuts
elsewhere. " ' The result is that cable consumers who
spent the most on more expensive programming tiers
or additional equipment, such as remote controls and
converter boxes, received lower bills. In contrast,
those subscribing to the most basic service were
forced to pay a higher monthly rate. "
A good example is MetroVision Cable, which
serves approximately 66,000 subscribers in Prince
As of August 18,
George's County, Maryland."
1993, MetroVision charged consumers $21.45 per
month for sixty-seven channels of basic service; a remote control unit cost an additional $3.00 per
month, and service to a second television set cost another $3.50 per month." Applying the FCC regulations to the above charges produced interesting results. According to these rules, MetroVision could
only charge the costs of the remote control and the
second television set plus a slight profit of 11.25%. " '
Therefore, users with these items-approximately
75% of MetroVision's subscribers-received a major
price decrease. But, according to MetroVision, the
prices it charges for basic cable rates are below the
FCC established benchmark. Therefore, Metrovision
expected to raise rates for basic service from $21.45
to $21.98 per month. " 6 As a result, subscribers that
paid more, saved more. The opposite, however, was
not true. Those who subscribed to "bare bones"
'30

Rate Freeze Order, supra note 75, para. 4.

Id. See also Paul Farhi, New FCC Rules Cut Most
Cable TV Bills, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al, A8.
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Id.
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See Rate Freeze Order, supra note 75.
See Aversa, FCC Queries 35 More Operators on Rate
Violations, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 20, 1993. In November and December of 1993, the Commission sent letters to 51
companies in 37 states, asking them to explain a variety of fees
and charges. A third batch of letters was also sent out in early
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cable service received price increases.
The FCC was powerless to act. In November
1993, the Commission did attempt to turn the tide in
its favor by sending out letters of inquiry admonishing various cable operators for allegedly violating the
Rate Freeze Order' and evading the FCC's regulations in general. "' But the Commission and Congress eventually found that their hands were tied because both government bodies had in fact explicitly
endorsed this manner of raising rates with the 1992
Cable Act and the FCC's corresponding rate regulation rules.
In response to the Commission's first round of inquiries, cable companies argued that the FCC recognized that cable operators would have to adjust rates
for various channel offerings prior to the effective
date of rate regulation in order to comply with Commission regulations. " 9 Additionally, the FCC concluded that:
[M]any operators are discovering that while their rates
• . . are below the reasonable level . . . rates for other
services are much too high. In this situation, the FCC's
rules permit... the cable operator to increase the rate for
the low-priced service in order to offset the rate decrease
that it must make for the high-priced service."'

For MultiVision's subscribers in Prince George's
County, Maryland, the result was not surprising-seventeen percent of MultiVision's customers
experienced rate increases.1 4 Subscribers to "bare
bones" service, such as customers with the basic tier
only and customers with basic, plus the cable programming service tier, suffered increases. " 2 Subscribers with additional remote controls, additional
converter boxes, and/or additional outlets, however,
received a rate deduction. "
Another problem arose from what has become
known as "a la carte" pricing. "A la carte" pricing
occurs when a cable operator takes certain channels
out of its basic tier, such as Superstation WTBS, and
1994.
189
Letter from John I. Davis, to Roy J. Stewart, Chief,
MM, FCC (Dec. 17, 1993); Letter from Thomas Sharrard, Division Pres., Warner Cable Communications, to Roy J. Stewart,
Chief, MM, FCC (Dec. 16, 1993); Letter from Gardner F. Gillespie, Attorney for C-TEC Cable Systems of Michigan, Inc., to
Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, FCC (Dec. 17, 1993) (contact the
Mass Media Bureau for a copy of these letters (202) 632-7000).
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1994]

offers them separately for an additional monthly
charge.' 44 Because the 1992 Cable Act requires the
regulation of only the basic tier channels and cable
programming services, by removing certain channel
offerings from the basic tier, and offering them on a
per channel basis, a cable operator removes any
FCC jurisdiction over such programming and the
corresponding rates.'4 5 "A la carte" pricing also can
result in higher rates for customers. CableVision of
Central Florida, serving 200,000 subscribers, restructured its rates by using "a la carte" pricing.' "
CableVision dropped its basic and expanded services
by one dollar, but removed three channels, American
Movie Classics, and Superstations WTBS and
WGN, from its basic service tier. 4' Subsequently,
CableVision offered those channels in a package deal

[of program services] is a major step in this direction.
Cable operatorsand programmers are urged to work
toward this objective .

...

","

Apparently clutching at its last regulatory straw, the
Commission tried to argue that these "a la carte"
packages did not offer consumers a "realistic service
choice," 1" ' because, in effect, the consumer had no
choice but to stay with the package because it was
less expensive."" According to cable operators, however, the gravamen of the Commission's claim was
absurd:
The discount for the [a la carte] package, to be sure,
makes the package desirable for any subscriber who wants
three or four or more of the ... [a la carte] channels. But
it would be a strange perversion of the regulatory process
for the FCC to suggest . . . that [a cable operator] must
increase its price for the [a la carte] package to give subscribers a more "realistic" choice of taking more channels
individually."'

for $2.97 a month. 4 8 Therefore, despite the lower
monthly rate, many subscribers paid more to receive

the same number of channels.
As before, the FCC and Congress were powerless

to act because they themselves had expressed the
"belief that greater unbundling of offerings [i.e., "a
la carte" packaging] leads to more subscriber choice
and greater competition among program services. ' " "
Therefore, upon receipt of the Commission's letters
of inquiry, cable companies simply argued that it
was doing what the Commission authorized them to
do.' The FCC had stated that "restructuring program offerings to provide more 'a la carte' services is
not per se undesirable, as offering programming on a
per-channel basis increases consumer choice, which
is one of the goals of the Act."'' Even Congress
made it clear that "one of the prime goals of the legislation is to enhance subscriber choice. Unbundling
14"

Letter from Gardner F. Gillespie to Roy J. Stewart,

supra note 139, at 6-7.
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carte" regulation, however, the cable operator must ensure that
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channel or component service, and (2) the cable operator must
offer the channels included in any "a la carte" package to subscribers separately in addition to the collective offering. Rate Order, supra note 4, paras. 327-329; Second Rate Order, supra
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Thomas Sharrard to Roy J. Stewart, supra note 139, at 2.
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Epilogue - The Second Rollback

B.

The Commission's final report on its cable rate
survey initiated in November 1993, arrived on February 22, 1994.58 Despite the fact that the survey
revealed that regulated rates, on average, actually
declined by 5.9%,157 the FCC, undoubtedly succumbing to congressional and public furor over the
last twelve months, modified, among other things,
the original benchmark approach for determining
regulated rates."
First, the Commission further reduced rates by
seven percent." As a result, cable operators must
set rates according to their September 30, 1992,
Rate Reconsideration Order, supra note 67, para. 35.
Id. (emphasis added)(citing S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 77 (1992)).
'" This requirement must be fulfilled by the cable operator
in order to avoid regulation of its "a la carte" offerings. The
"realistic service choice" standard is satisfied when the cable operator offers the component parts of any "a la carte" package
separately in addition to the collective offering. See Rate Order,
supra note 4, paras. 327-329.
'1 Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, FCC to
Michael J. Mahoney, Executive Vice-President, C-TEC (Nov.
17, 1993)(contact the Cable Services Bureau of the FCC for a
copy of this letter (202) 632-7000).
155
Letter from Gardner F. Gillespie to Roy J. Stewart,
supra note 139, at 10 (emphasis added).
"' Action in Docket Case-FCC Releases Final Report on
Cable Rate Survey (MM Dkt. No. 92-266), FCC News, Feb.
22, 1994, at 1.
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Second Rate Order, supra note 6, para. 19.
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levels, then reduce them by the new seventeen percent "competitive differential.' 0 The FCC reasoned that, upon further analysis, it had understated
the competitive differential by only weighing systems
on the basis of the number of systems subject to effective competition, as opposed to "analyz[ing] the
data from all three types of systems [exempt from
rate regulation] .

.

. and .

.

. us[ing] a qualitative,

rather than arithmetic analysis, to determine the differential whose application best approximates the
'reasonable rate' that would be charged by a system
that faces effective competition."' 6'
Second, and perhaps most important, the FCC
also opened the door to regulating "a la carte" packages, which it had declined to do in its first Report
and Order."' The Commission will now balance various factors in determining whether a particular "a
la carte" package is violative of the Commission's
rules. "A la carte" offerings will have a presumption
of validity if several of the following factors are
present:
1. the cable operator had offered, or considered offering,
"a la carte" packages consisting of nonpremium channels
prior to rate regulation;
2. the operator has conducted market research that suggests that introducing an "a la carte" package would be
profitable, other than as a means of evading rate
regulation;
3. the cable subscriber is free to select which channels will
be included in the package;
4. subscribers are given notice that discloses their options,
including total price (including related equipment
charges) associated with exercising any of these options;
and

5. an insignificant percentage or number of channels in
the package has been removed from regulated tiers."

By the same token, the FCC also enumerated various factors that would weigh against the unregulated
treatment of an "a la carte" package:
pursuant to its first Report and Orderissued May 3, 1993. See
Rate Order, supra note 4.
16o Second Rate Order, supra note 6. The competitive differential represents the difference between a "reasonable" rate and
a rate charged by a cable operator not subject to effective competition. See Executive Summary-Implementation of Sections of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992; Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (MM Dkt. No. 93-215), FCC News, Feb. 22,
1994. It should also be noted that cable operators who wish to
charge higher rates may still elect to invoke cost of service
procedures.
16
Second Rate Order, supra note 6. The three types of systems exempt from rate regulation are systems that have penetration rates of less than 30%, systems that face actual competition,
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1. the "a la carte" package results in avoiding rate reductions otherwise required by the FCC's rules;
2. a significant percentage or number of channels in the
package were removed from regulated tiers;
3. the package price is so deeply discounted when compared to individual channel prices that it does not constitute a realistic set of service choices because subscribers
will not have any realistic options other than subscribing
to the package;
4. the channels taken from regulated tiers have not traditionally been marketed "a la carte";
5. an entire regulated tier has been eliminated and turned
into an "a la carte" package;
6. the subscriber must pay a significant equipment charge
to purchase an individual channel in the package;
7. the subscriber must pay a "downgrade charge" to
purchase an individual channel in the package;
8. the "a la carte" package includes channels that were
removed from lower tiers of channels, requiring lower tier
subscribers to buy one or more intermediate tiers to receive the same channels;
9. subscribers are automatically subscribed to an "a la
carte" package (so-called negative option billing); and
10. affected programmers object to the restructuring of
their services into "a la carte" packages.'"

If the Commission finds that an "a la carte" package was created solely for the purpose of avoiding
rate regulation, it will treat the offering as a regulated tier." The operator of such an "a la carte"
package would then face either forfeitures or other
sanctions.' 66
The 1992 Cable Act's primary objective is to
lower cable rates for all cable subscribers. Until
now, that objective had not been realized. The opposite is true. The real mystery behind the rate increases can be found in the 1992 Cable Act itself.
The Act, and the FCC's subsequent regulations,
clearly failed to fully analyze the way in which cable
operators do business. Congress oversimplified cable
rate regulation so that cable operators could circumvent many rate regulation mandates, in what Chairman Quello has dubbed "creative pricing."
and systems that are operated by municipalities. Id. See also
Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 623(e)(1).
10
According to the 1992 Cable Act and FCC regulations,
only rates for the basic cable service tier and cable programming
service are subject to regulation. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.33(a)(1)
(1993); Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 623(c).
16
Second Rate Order, supra note 6, para. 194. The Commission will find in favor of non-regulation if it can be shown
that (1) a channel has traditionally been offered "a ia carte," or
(2) if the subscriber may select the channels to be included in an
"a la carte" offering. Id.
164
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The question now is whether the Commission's
Second Rate Order will close the floodgates. The
FCC has apparently cut cable operators off at the
pass by setting the stage for the regulation of "a la
carte" packages, and by lowering the competitive differential by seven percent. Nevertheless, the Commission's Second Rate Order may not be enough. In
fact, back in May 1993, the FCC even denounced "a
la carte"
regulation
as
being ineffective.
"[R]egulation [of 'a la carte' packages] . . . might be
counterproductive. If cable operators are subject to
regulation and exposed to complaints simply by combining premium services into an integrated package,
they likely will refrain from making such offerings even when the collective package would be offered at
a reduced rate."' 67 Such regulation, the Commission
stated, "could disadvantage consumers by denying
them discounts on packages of per-channel or perprogram services and by limiting subscriber access to
a greater quantity of premium programming. "68
Perhaps the problem lies within the very framework for rate regulation. It seems that the Commission viewed "cable rates" as the sum of various, independent parts, consisting of rates for basic service
tiers, cable programming service, and equipment.
The FCC apparently concluded that cable rate regulation would be effective if the individual parts were
simply separated from the whole and their respective
rates reduced by ten percent. Unfortunately, this
conclusion was fallacious in its conception because
rates for the various components mentioned above
have always been hopelessly intertwined by cable operators, thus making such a regulatory framework
ineffective. For example, lowering rates for the cable
programming service tier resulted in higher rates for
the basic cable tier. As a result, consumers who subscribed only to the basic service tier saw their rates
increase, while those subscribers with additional pro167
lee

Rate Order, supra note 4, para. 329.
Id.

gramming and equipment did not. Merely separating the parts, it seems, does not effective regulation
make.
That is not to say that the FCC's rate regulations
are totally ineffective. Savings have been realized
with reductions in equipment charges, such as converter boxes and remote controls. Further, the price
cap mechanism is arguably the real utility of the
1992 Cable Act. Before regulation, cable rates
skyrocketed three times the rate of inflation. 169 But
the price cap mechanism ensures that rate increases
parallel rising inflation, thereby preventing arbitrary
rate increases from cable operators who later claim
inflation is to blame.
Nevertheless, the Commission must begin employing insight into the inner workings of the cable industry in order to stay one step ahead of "creative"
cable operators. The Second Rate Order could be a
step in the right direction. If it is not, however, debate over the 1992 Cable Act and rate regulation
will increase far more than rates have.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1992 Cable Act, lauded as the panacea for
exorbitant cable television rates and inadequate customer service, has not been as effective as promised.
Poor draftsmanship and a lack of foresight into the
actual inner workings of the cable television industry
by Congress and the FCC have diluted the 1992
Cable Act's original promise. These mistakes have
allowed cable companies to take advantage of various
loopholes, resulting in higher cable rates for many
consumers. These mistakes also threaten to redefine
the 1992 Cable Act not as a breakthrough, but as a
backfire.
16

H.R. Rep. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1992).

